Murtala Ibrahim
The corruption allegations against Abdullahi Ibrahim Rogo, Director General of Protocol for Kano State, represent a serious compliance and governance concern.
Daily Nigerian, through rigorous investigative journalism, reports that between November 2023 and February 2025, approximately ₦6.5 billion was allegedly siphoned from Kano’s Directorate of Protocol.
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Documents obtained by anti-graft agencies indicate the funds were funneled through three entities, H&M Nigeria Limited, A.Y. Maikifi Petroleum, and Ammas Oil & Gas Limited, using fictitious contracts.
Investigators concluded that these contracts were never executed and that funds were eventually transferred to currency dealers and converted into United States dollars.
Evidence of Shell Companies and Currency Exchanges
Court filings cited in the exposé show that A.Y. Maikifi Petroleum and Ammas Oil & Gas Limited received over ₦1.17 billion from Kano State’s accounts.
Shortly after, two Bureau de Change firms, Kazo Nazo Global Resources and Namu Naku Ne, received ₦539,230,000 and ₦570,000,024.50 respectively. These sums were allegedly converted into dollars and delivered in cash to Mr. Rogo.
From a compliance perspective, this transaction chain reflects classic red flags for trade based money laundering and abuse of shell entities.
The indicators include fictitious contracts, cash withdrawals in breach of financial thresholds, and reliance on Bureau de Change operators to obscure audit trails.
Government Response and Omitted Details
The Kano government spokesperson, Mr. Sunusi Bature Dawakintofa, whom I know personally and regard as a respectable professional, dismissed the allegations as politically motivated.
However, the response did not address the critical compliance question: were funds indeed transferred to Bureau de Change operators and later collected in cash?
This omission is material. In compliance and control assessments, avoidance of direct rebuttal on core financial flows weakens credibility and raises strong suspicion. The silence effectively leaves the most significant allegation unanswered.
To provide a proper response, the government needs to clarify which specific bank accounts originated the payments and which accounts received them, confirm whether vendor bank statements show onward transfers to Bureau de Change operators or large cash withdrawals matching the amounts in the exposé, and present procurement files and payment vouchers containing evidence of goods or services delivered that justify the payments.
Legal Framework
The alleged conduct conflicts with Nigeria’s key statutory and regulatory provisions:
Money Laundering (Prevention and Prohibition) Act, 2022
Section 2 prohibits cash transactions above ₦5 million for individuals and ₦10 million for corporate entities outside financial institutions.
Section 2(2) also criminalizes structuring transactions to avoid reporting requirements.
The Act further makes it an offence to conceal, convert, or transfer the proceeds of unlawful activity in order to disguise their origin.
Public Service Rules (2008)
The Rules classify acts such as misappropriation of funds, diversion, bribery, and scandalous conduct that tarnishes the reputation of the service as serious misconduct. Such actions are punishable by dismissal and other sanctions.
Federal Financial Regulations (2009)
FR 613: Requires that payments be made only to named payees and not through intermediaries.
FR 3106 and FR 3117: Mandate that irregular or unauthorized payments be recovered and that officers responsible be sanctioned.
FR 3124: Provides for recovery of advances not properly accounted for.
Taken together, these provisions confirm that channeling public funds through fictitious contracts and Bureau de Change operators represents a breach of Nigeria’s anti money laundering framework, the Public Service Rules, and the Federal Financial Regulations.
Analysis of the Spokesperson’s Silence
In risk and compliance review, silence on core transactional details often signals vulnerability.
The failure to directly address whether funds were converted to cash through Bureau de Change operators undermines the credibility of the denial.
Once documented trails exist, avoidance becomes a reputational and governance risk that raises strong suspicion and compounds the legal exposure of the state.
To strengthen credibility, the government should have provided evidence such as vendor onboarding files, including Corporate Affairs Commission records, Persons with Significant Control disclosures, Know Your Customer documentation, Tax Identification Numbers, and Special Control Unit against Money Laundering (SCUML) registration; procurement documents like purchase orders, delivery notes, inspection reports, and tender board approvals; certified bank statements that show full transaction trails; and proof that the Bureau de Change operators involved filed the required Cash Transaction Reports and Suspicious Transaction Reports.
Conclusion
The Daily Nigerian exposé has illuminated a high risk compliance breakdown. The misuse of shell companies, abuse of public finance processes, and deliberate reliance on Bureau de Change operators to disguise fund flows show systemic weaknesses.
If substantiated, the allegations breach Nigeria’s anti money laundering laws, the Public Service Rules, and established Financial Regulations.
For Kano State, the issue now extends beyond political rhetoric. This is a compliance and control matter that demands transparent investigation, enforcement of financial integrity standards, and accountability for public officers.
Daily Nigerian has performed its role as a governance watchdog. The burden now lies on state institutions and regulators to demonstrate that Nigeria’s financial integrity framework is not a paper tiger.
The people of Kano deserve accountability and the assurance that public funds will not be siphoned through illicit financial channels.
We are documenting all these issues so that the Kano State Government can retrace its steps, strengthen compliance, and correct the control failures that allowed such allegations to arise.
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Murtala A Ibrahim, PhD, FCA, is an expert in Compliance, Control, and Risk Management. He can be reached at murtala002@yahoo.com